One hundred years ago, a popular theory contended that various aspects of climate determined the physiology and psychology of individuals, which in turn defined the behavior and culture of the societies that those individuals formed. As the ideological wars of the twentieth century reshaped political and moral worlds, environmental determinism became discredited and marginalised within mainstream academic thought. Yet at the beginning of a new century with heightening anxieties about changes in climate, the idea that climate can determine the fate of people and society has re-emerged in the form of 'climate reductionism'. This paper traces how climate has moved from playing a deterministic to a reductionist role in discourses about environment, society and the future. Climate determinism previously offered an explanation, and hence a justification, for the superiority of certain imperial races and cultures. The argument put forward here is that the new climate reductionism is driven by the hegemony exercised by the predictive natural sciences over contingent, imaginative and humanistic accounts of social life and visions of the future. It is a hegemony which lends disproportionate power in political and social discourse to model-based descriptions of putative future climates. Some possible reasons for this climate reductionism, as well as some of the limitations and dangers of this position for human relationships with the future, are suggested.
eschatological rhetoric offers a post-2016 world where the degrees of human freedom and agency are extinguished by the iron-grip of the forces of climate. Such a narrative offers scant chance for humans to escape the inevitability of a climate-shaped destiny 24 . Jim Lovelock offers the most vivid melodrama of such a pre-determined fate. We are travelling, he says, on "a rocky path to a Stone Age existence on an ailing planet, one where few of us survive among the wreckage of our once biodiverse Earth" 25 My argument in this paper is that these sentiments, and many others which invade , climate becomes the one 'known' variable in an otherwise unknowable future. The openness, contingency and multiple possibilities of the future are closed off as these predicted virtual climates assert their influence over everything from future ecology, economic activity and social mobility, to human behaviour, cultural evolution and geosecurity. It is climate reductionism exercised through what I call 'epistemological slippage' -a transfer of predictive authority from one domain of knowledge to another without appropriate theoretical or analytical justification.
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Before elaborating this proposition, I first offer a brief account of the decline in climate determinism through the twentieth century before illustrating the recent rise of reductionist thinking. I then defend my thesis -climate reductionism resulting from the enterprise of climate prediction and the practice of epistemological slippage -drawing upon key events, developments and texts from the 1960s to 1990s. In particular I demonstrate the asymmetry between representations of future climate versus social change which has persisted in the conduct of climate impact assessments. I conclude the paper by placing this reductionist tendency within a wider cultural context of Western pessimism and loss of confidence about the future and by pointing towards some correctives which involve restructuring ideas about how the future can be imagined and made known.
The demise of climate determinism
The story of environmental determinism, and especially the climatic variant on which I focus, is well known -at least it is well known to academic geographers who have had to wrestle with the difficult relationships between environmental conditions and human agency ever since the discipline took form in the later nineteenth century 28 28 Harold MacKinder, "On the scope and methods of geography", Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 9(1887): 141-160.
. The argument of previous generations of determinists was that aspects of climate exerted a powerful shaping influence on the physiology and psychology of individuals and races, which in turn shaped decisively the culture, organization and behavior of the society formed by those individuals and races. Tropical climates were said to cause laziness and promiscuity, while the frequent variability in the weather of the middle latitudes led to more vigorous and driven work ethics. Evidence of these . Determinism in fact offered a softening of the strident Nazi racism, by claiming that people could be 'improved' if they were put in the right environment; it was not all down to one's Aryan genetic ancestry.
47 43 Sluyter, "Neo-environmental determinism", 816.
, while also in the 1950s the prolific English climatologist Charles Brooks was taken to 44 Meyer Both these examples offer a one-eyed view of the future, yet it is one which pervades many recent academic analyses of climate change and social impact 59 ; and consequently it is an account of the future which enters easily into public perception and discourse 60 
The epistemic community of global climate modelling
The 1960s and 1970s had witnessed the development of the first computer-based simulation models of a universal and globally-connected climate system 75 . Originally an extension of numerical weather prediction models, these new climate-oriented models allowed experiments with global models to be performed in virtual reality which were not possible in physical reality. These models were constructed initially by meteorologists and atmospheric scientists in a small number of research centres in the USA, UK and Germany. They were later joined by oceanographers, atmospheric chemists and biologists as the models extended their representation from simply the climate system (initially the atmosphere) to the deeply coupled components of the Earth system. This move was encapsulated in NASA's 1988 report Earth System Science: A Closer View, the so-called 'Bretherton Report' 76 . The report was leadauthored by Francis Bretherton, an applied mathematician and atmospheric scientist, and the goal of this new scientific mission was "to obtain a scientific understanding of the entire Earth system on a global scale" and predictions were to be secured by using "quantitative models of the Earth system to identify and simulate global trends" Kates lays out the methodological challenges of performing climate impact assessments, three of which are particularly relevant for the argument presented here. First, he acknowledges an explicit knowledge hierarchy between the "hard" sciences and the "soft" sciences. As one moves from understanding global heat balances to the impacts of climate change on nutrition, for example, there is "less predictability, more speculation and greater uncertainty" schematic diagrams, one of which he calls the "impact model" and one the "interaction model"
(reproduced here in Figure 1 ). In the former, climate change determines the impact directly, whilst in the latter the impacts are the joint products of the interaction between climate and social change. And it is the former model which Kates claimed was predominant in nearly all attempts at climate impact assessment, these studies "going directly from climate events to inferences of higher-order consequences" 94 . Reflecting on the reasons for this paucity of studies which sought to embrace a more interactive framework of climate-society relationships, as opposed to the instinct to revert to a cruder deterministic or reductionistic account, Kates remarks that it is due "partly to disciplinary isolation and partly to the limited effort expended to date on the study of the interaction of climate and society as compared to the study of the dynamics of climate itself" 95 .
how the many other dimensions of cultural, social and political life may change in the future.
Climate reductionism through "epistemological slippage" was the result. And so the future is reduced to climate. 
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Climate reductionism is a limited and deficient methodology for adequately accessing the future. In his poetic essay "The end of the world", environmental historian Stephen Pyne offers an insight into similar reductionist limitations with regard to the past:
.
Reductionism is good for extracting resources and for creating instruments, medicines, gadgets; but it does not -cannot -tell us how to use them or when or why. It cannot convey meaning because meaning requires contrast, connections, context ... 
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